The Need

As most of you know, I spent half of my working life in the Navy.  These next two posts will give my ideas about what we in Canada need for a Navy and the problems of getting there.  But first, the need.

Canada is a maritime nation.  We have the longest coastline in the world with oceans on three sides.  A great deal of our trade travels by ship and we extract a significant amount of treasures from in and below the sea.  Sea power is necessary to protect this situation of our home country.  Sea power is also the best way to project our image and support to other parts of the world.  Sea power is the only way of projecting our presence overseas independent from the need to have friendly countries nearby to host our Army or Air Force units.  We need a Navy.

It is fair to ask what our Navy has done and continues to do for us today.  Even with the much diminished fleet we have right now, we are providing presence in the Caribbean to assist the US war on drugs; we are providing presence in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Africa and the Middle East where we have, among other things, made massive drug hauls and brought Somali piracy almost to a standstill.  The Navy provides units to the collective defence with the US and NATO allies, and ships to “show the flag” to highlight Canada.

But what kind and size of a Navy do we need?  We need a Navy that is big enough to provide both the defence of our own coastlines and the overseas presence needed to play our role as a world player, and to do it on two coasts.  We must also be able to show our sovereignty of the Arctic.  We must also cater to regular ship maintenance schedules plus the working up and training of ships’ crews. So what does that add up to?

The primary requirement is for four task groups, two on each coast.  One task group on each coast would be assigned to overseas deployments to the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean/ Western Pacific/ Mediterranean/ Northern Europe areas wherever the need arises.  The second task group on each coast would be assigned to more local duties including the Caribbean operations and joint operations with the US Navy.  For Arctic operations, the AOPS is the assigned class, but its capability in this regard is still to be proven.  Although the main operating base for these ships is meant to be the Halifax, consideration should be given to basing a couple of operational AOPS where they can serve the Bering Sea area.

With respect to the make-up of the task groups, each should be a self-contained group capable of extended deployments.  Each group should include one task force command capable ship, ideally with area air defence capability, such as the current Tribal Class destroyers, plus at least two more general purpose ships such as the current frigates.  In addition, each group should have its own replenishment capability.  This does not have to be in the nature of the envisioned Joint Support Ship, but a replacement for the current AORs providing fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts and one or two spare helicopters.  This would require four destroyers, eight frigates and four AORs.  However, to include the maintenance and training requirements, a minimum of at least an additional one third of each class would be necessary, thus a total of six destroyers, twelve frigates and six AORs.   This is the bare minimum for a truly capable Canadian Navy, but for contingencies where more powerful or split groups are required, consideration should be given to bolstering even this number with, for example, one additional destroyer and two more frigates.  These two classes could be built with a lot of commonality in hull and machinery, but different weapon and sensor suites, and levels of complexity.  Thus, the real need is for seven destroyers, fourteen frigates and six AORs.  I have not added a contingency AOR because we can sometimes rely on allied resources to fill gaps. 

 

A total of 27 new ships . . . that is a lot and will cost probably more money than current governments are ready to give.  However, if this level of fleet can be seen as the actual requirement, even if a lesser number of ships are acquired, this proposed level can be viewed as an unfulfilled requirement which is an unspoken promise to be filled when resources and the will allow.  This is the kind of case that must be made by the Navy using the desired level of commitment as the primary argument. 

The next post will discuss the acquisition process – its successes and failures.